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Behavioural flexibility is often treated as the gold standard of evidence for
more sophisticated or complex forms of animal cognition, such as planning,
metacognition and mindreading. However, the evidential link between
behavioural flexibility and complex cognition has not been explicitly or
systematically defended. Such a defence is particularly pressing because
observed flexible behaviours can frequently be explained by putatively sim-
pler cognitive mechanisms. This leaves complex cognition hypotheses open
to ‘deflationary’ challenges that are accorded greater evidential weight
precisely because they offer putatively simpler explanations of equal explana-
tory power. This paper challenges the blanket preference for simpler
explanations, and shows that once this preference is dispensed with, and the
full spectrum of evidence—including evolutionary, ecological and phylo-
genetic data—is accorded its proper weight, an argument in support of
the prevailing assumption that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence
for complex cognitive mechanisms may begin to take shape. An adaptive
model of cognitive-behavioural evolution is proposed, according to which
the existence of convergent trait–environment clusters in phylogenetically dis-
parate lineages may serve as evidence for the same trait–environment clusters
in other lineages. This, in turn, could permit inferences of cognitive complexity
in cases of experimental underdetermination, thereby placing the common
view that behavioural flexibility can serve as evidence for complex cognition
on firmer grounds.1. Introduction
According to the standard view in comparative cognition science, animal cogni-
tion is generally held to consist in the processes that generate flexible adaptive
behaviours in animals [1]. This conception of cognition is motivated by the
prima facie plausible assumption that flexible behaviour is underwritten by cog-
nitive processes, and that the more flexible the observed behaviour, the more
complex the cognitive processes that underlie it are likely to be (e.g. [2]). This
assumption shapes research programmes in comparative cognition,where behav-
ioural flexibility is often treated not only as the gold standard but also as the only
significant source of evidence for cognitive complexity [3–5]. Experiments are
designed to elicit flexible behaviours that respond appropriately to environmental
contingencies, and the observations of such behaviours are, in turn, thought to
license inferences about the presence (or absence) of a cluster of cognitive abilities
that are generally, if problematically (§2), regarded in the literature as being
sophisticated or complex—such as planning, concept formation, metacognition,
mindreading and so on [6].
Despite the received view among comparative cognition researchers and phi-
losophers of comparative cognition science that flexible behaviours can serve as
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link has not been explicitly and systematically defended.
Such a defence is particularly pressing in the light of the fact
that flexible behaviours can often be explained equally well
by adverting to putatively simpler cognitive mechanisms.
That is to say, the choice between alternative hypotheses that
advert to different levels of cognitive complexity is in many
cases underdetermined, in thatmultiple cognitive explanations
fit a set of observations equally well with no clear guiding
principle for resolving the impasse. As a result, experiments
purporting to show results that support an inference of com-
plex cognition remain open to ‘deflationary’ challenges.
Moreover, these deflationary hypotheses are often accorded
greater epistemic weight because their alternatives are taken
to be more complex—and this complexity is thought to
warrant a higher burden of proof than that accorded to puta-
tively simpler explanations of equal explanatory power.
This methodological state of affairs leaves the evidential con-
nection between flexible behaviour and complex cognition on
tenuous grounds.
This paper argues that once behavioural flexibility and
cognitive complexity are conceptually disentangled, the pre-
ference for simpler explanations is dispensed with, and the
full spectrum of evidence (including evolutionary and eco-
logical data) is accorded its proper weight, an argument
in support of the prevailing assumption that behaviou-
ral flexibility can serve as evidence of complex cognitive
mechanisms may begin to take shape. Section 2 explains
why behavioural flexibility and cognitive complexity must
be conceptually decoupled if the prevailing assumption is
to be empirically tenable. Section 3 shows how this con-
ceptual separation leads to a problem of experimental
underdetermination—one that is exacerbated by a preference
for explanatory simplicity that shapes methodological design
in ways that further attenuate the evidential link bet-
ween behavioural flexibility and forms of cognition that are
commonly regarded as complex. Because this preference
for simpler explanations appears to be unwarranted on con-
ceptual, theoretical and empirical grounds, it does not
adequately resolve the underdetermination problem. Section
4 proposes an adaptive model of cognitive-behavioural
evolution, according to which the existence of convergent
trait–environment clusters in phylogenetically (and hence
developmentally) disparate lineages can serve as evidence
for the same trait–environment clusters in other lineages,
thus permitting reliable inferences of cognitive complexity
in cases of experimental underdetermination. The novelty
of this account lays not so much in its theory of the evolution
of cognitive complexity per se, but in establishing a deeply
convergent regularity that can inform hypothesis testing
and theory adjudication in experimental psychology sett-
ings in which the cognitive capacities of distantly related
organisms are investigated. Because the model identifies a
non-accidental regularity that is robust across body plans
and divergent developmental systems, it can license infer-
ences about the presence of complex cognitive mechanisms
in disparate animal groups. This, in turn, can affect the
choice of null hypothesis and burden of proof allocation in
comparative cognition—a field that traditionally has not
drawn on evolutionary concepts, methods and data in
designing experiments and interpreting results. The pro-
posed model is then applied to case examples and several
objections to its validity are considered.More broadly, the goal of this paper is to show how evol-
utionary science can inform experimental programmes that
are normally carried out in relative isolation from evolution-
ary concepts and methods. Evolutionary science is often
regarded as a purely historical enterprise, one that is tasked
with reconstructing phylogenies and explaining the origins
and current distributions of traits by adverting to evolution-
ary processes that acted on populations in the distant past.
This might lead one to think that the epistemic tools and
goals of evolutionary biology are orthogonal to psychological
investigations of the present cognitive capacities of animals.
However, evolutionary concepts and methods, such as
those relating to adaptation and homology, can provide
clues about what sorts of cognitive capacities may be present
in the contemporary time slice of a lineage. They also provide
an evolutionary, ecological and phylogenetic context against
which to adjudicate alternative proximate cognitive expla-
nations of observed animal behaviour. In illustrating this, the
proposedmodel serves as a corrective for a priorimethodologi-
cal biases in comparative cognition, such as the preference for
simpler cognitive explanations, which appear to systematically
undervalue the evidential weight of behavioural flexibility.
Employing a more diverse range of epistemic resources could
allow behavioural flexibility to serve (under certain conditions)
as reliable evidence of cognitive complexity, thus placing the
received view in comparative cognition on firmer footing.
Just as importantly, it reveals a rich and largely untapped
source of evidence external to the laboratory (inparticular, from
evolutionary biology) that can be drawn upon to support—or
deflate—complex cognition hypotheses.2. Problems of concept and evidence
Although cognition is not typically defined in terms of behav-
iour, it is often equated with the proximate mechanisms that
produce flexible behaviour. For instance, as philosopher of
cognitive science Kristin Andrews describes it in the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on the subject, ‘animal cog-
nition is constituted by the processes used to generate . . .
flexible behaviour in animal species’ [1]. Yet, by building be-
havioural outputs into the definition of cognition, the link
between behavioural flexibility and particular cognitive
mechanisms is established by definition. This conceptual
coupling is common not only in comparative cognition but
also in philosophical action theory (e.g. [7]), where behaviour
is often distinguished from mere movement in terms of its
proximate cognitive drivers. The problem with this, however,
is that such a coupling is only appropriate in cases where the
proximate causes of behaviour have already been established
a posteriori. Initially, observations of some phenomenon P
may serve as evidence for the existence of a particular mech-
anism M that is hypothesized to be a cause of P; as the
evidence base for M grows to the point that M is shown to
be a cause of P beyond any reasonable doubt, then M will
not only come to figure in received explanations of P, but
may also become incorporated into the very definition
of P. For example, consider the concept of ‘adaptive
match’—the functional fit between the traits of an organism
and the ecological design problems it needs to solve. Adap-
tive match was not always understood as the product of
natural selection; non-Darwinian evolutionary theories as
well as creationist ones were initially offered to explain
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selection was the only plausible cause of adaptive match
accumulated and achieved ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’
status in biological science, the concepts of adaptation and
function in biology came to build in the mechanism of natural
selection. Traits which are now regarded as ‘adaptations’ are
those that have been subject to a history of selection for their
effects, and these effects are known as their ‘functions’ [8].
In short, it is inadvisable to build specific mechanisms
into the definition of a biological trait if that trait is multiply
realizable or if its proximate causes are unclear [9]. Although
natural selection remains on secure epistemic footing as the
only known mechanism for producing complex functional
design, the cognitive mechanisms that produce behavioural
flexibility are precisely what are at issue in comparative cogni-
tion, and there is reason to believe that behavioural flexibility
may bemultiply realizable (i.e. produced by both sophisticated
cognitive mechanisms and putatively simpler ones). Given this
enduring controversy in the field of animal cognition, it would
clearly be premature to incorporate any particular proximate
cognitive mechanisms into the definition of behavioural flexi-
bility or, conversely, to incorporate particular behavioural
outputs into the definition of cognition (or complex cognition).
Even more problematically, such a coupling prevents obser-
vations of behavioural flexibility from serving as evidence for
the presence of complex cognition.
For these reasons, it is preferable to have a working
definition of cognition (and complex cognition) that does
not incorporate behavioural outputs. This may seem like an
obvious desideratum from the standpoint of biologically
oriented approaches to cognition; however, as discussed
above, incorporating specific types of behavioural outputs
into the definition of cognition or, conversely, delineating cer-
tain types of behaviour in terms of the cognitive mechanisms
that produce them, is commonplace in comparative cognition
and the philosophy of action. There are many definitions
of cognition on offer in the literature, which separate cogni-
tion from behavioural outputs. For present purposes, we
will presume the least controversial and most biologically
applicable account among these: namely, the notion that
cognition is a form of information-processing and ‘refers to
the mechanisms by which animals acquire, process, store
and act on information from the environment’ [10, p. 4].
This ‘big tent’ approach to cognition grants minimal forms
of cognition to a wide variety of organisms with very different
neurological capacities, sensory modalities, and lifeways (for
defences of such an account, see [11,12]). At the same time, it
rejects narrow ‘top-down’ approaches that restrict cognition
to a small range of organisms by presuming that cognition
entails some highly atypical property, such as the possession
of language or reason. Restrictive accounts of cognition are
generally built around the intuition that some entities (e.g.
microbes, plants, termites, cruise missiles, etc.) are paradigma-
tically non-cognitive while others (e.g. average adult humans)
are paradigmatically cognitive, with the success of a given
account gauged by how well it conforms to these intuitions.
For instance, after honeybees were discovered to be capable
of marked and rapid learning, the criterion of learning as a
mark of intelligence was discarded. As Chittka et al. [13,
p. 2678] note, ‘theremay be good reasons not to equate learning
speedwith intelligence, but the fact that humans do not top the
chart should not be one of them.’ Big tent accounts of cognition,
by contrast, such as the one adopted here, are phylogeneticallyinclusive in that they focus on some widely and continuously
distributed property that permits cross-species comparisons
and generates evolutionary hypotheses. On the present
account, cognition includes any information processing that
occurs in the organism and enables it to interact with its
environment. This encompasses not only centralized infor-
mation processing that occurs in brains, but also information
processing that takes place in peripheral nervous systems, per-
ceptual modalities and non-neural cellular systems of
representation.1
Such a phylogenetically inclusive account is controversial.
Many cognition theorists have attempted to distinguish cog-
nition from perception, for instance, by restricting cognition
to certain types of information processing, formats of rep-
resentation or degrees of encapsulation [14]. Nevertheless,
an information-processing account is broad enough to cap-
ture many or all types of cognition, and can fit into an
evolutionarily ecological framework that explains why cogni-
tion exists in the forms and taxonomic distributions that it
does without ruling out the possibility that more complex
forms of cognition may be found in organisms that are dis-
tantly related to humans. Such a big tent conception of
cognition does not, however, provide us with the conceptual
resources to distinguish intuitively simpler from intuitively
more complex forms of cognition, because information pro-
cessing is a continuous phenomenon that encompasses both
higher-level and lower-level processes. What the big tent
conception does provide is a phylogenetically inclusive theor-
etical foundation that stands the best chance of unifying and
explaining the assorted mechanisms and processes that are
plausibly characterized as cognitive and which enable organ-
isms to interact successfully (and often flexibly) with their
environments. ‘Phylogenetically inclusive’ here means more
than the mere methodological injunction to keep an open
mind with respect to in which branches of the tree of life par-
ticular cognitive mechanisms may be found. It means
understanding cognition as ubiquitous in the living world,
much like replication and metabolism—even if varieties of
cognition, like forms of metabolism and replication, vary
widely across the whole of life. This big tent account of cog-
nition can serve as a unifying framework for explanations
of all cognitive forms, from ‘simple’ to ‘complex’, and the
behaviours to which they give rise—a framework that under-
pins the model of cognitive-behavioural evolution proposed
in §4.
At present, it is unclear whether the types of cognition
typically identified in the comparative cognition literature as
comparably complex—and on the basis of this supposed com-
plexity accorded a weightier burden of proof in hypothesis
adjudication (§3)—have any common properties by virtue of
which they can meaningfully be classified as ‘complex’. It is
possible—though far from definitive—that the represen-
tational forms underwriting cognitive mechanisms intuitively
considered complex differ from putatively simpler forms
of information processing (such as perception) in terms of
their degree of stimulus-independence, recombinability and/
or encapsulation [15]. Such cognitive properties may be
especially important in generating flexible behaviour, as
more significant than the sheer amount of information an
organism is capable of processing is how that information is
packaged or encoded [16,17] and made accessible to other
cognitive processes. Not only do some coding formats make
it possible to process a greater total quantity of information,
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forms—such as planning, concept-formation, causal reason-
ing, intentionality, mindreading, metacognition and episodic
memory—processes that may underwrite important types of
behavioural flexibility observed in the field and elicited in the
laboratory [6].
Much more could obviously be said about information
processing accounts of cognitive mechanisms standardly
identified by the comparative psychology community as com-
plex. For present purposes, we remain agnostic as to whether
any unifying theory of such mechanisms—and more particu-
larly, of what makes them comparably complex—can be
found. There are serious difficulties confronting attempts to
conceptualize and operationalize biological complexity in gen-
eral—difficulties that are onlymagnified in the cognitive realm.
Yet despite thesemanifest difficultieswith complexity talk, this
paper retains the term because it does substantive theoretical
and methodological work in comparative cognition research.
As will be discussed in more detail shortly, it is precisely
because the cognitive abilities mentioned above are typically
regarded as relatively complex that they are treated as requir-
ing higher burdens of proof than supposedly simpler
hypotheses, particularly in the context of non-linguistic organ-
isms (including developing humans).When this paper refers to
‘cognitive complexity’, therefore, it merely intends to pick out
this intuitive usage. It remains neutral as towhether the cluster
of cognitive abilities typically identified as complex (i) falls
along a continuum of complexity or is structured by discrete,
scalar jumps, (ii) is theoretically unifiable or represents a natu-
ral kind class [6,18], and (iii) is underpinned by a notion of
complexity that is operationalizable in the cognitive case.
Indeed, it is scepticism about the last point that will motivate
our suggestion that the preference for simplicity be modified
or abandoned (§3).
Unlike cognition, which has a wide-ranging and dedi-
cated literature, far less has been written about the nature
of behaviour, and even less about behavioural flexibility.
One might initially question whether behaviour can fruitfully
be described in a-cognitive terms. That is, even if one heeds
our recommendation not to build complex cognitive mechan-
isms into the definition of behavioural flexibility, the problem
remains that many behaviours are commonly delineated in
reference to their underlying cognitive mechanisms. This is
true not only for intentional actions in adult humans, but
also for many non-human animal behaviours that are com-
monly described in loosely intentional terms. For example,
when describing behaviour, we often say that an animal
is ‘reaching for X’ rather than ‘extending a limb and touch-
ing X’. The prevalence of the former type of description of
animal behaviour, which appears to incorporate particular
cognitive mechanisms, is explicable in two ways—neither of
which poses a problem for our view that complex cognition
and behavioural flexibility should be definitionally distinct.
First, the former behavioural description may simply serve
as shorthand for the latter less economical one, in which
case the former description could be cashed out in purely
behavioural terms. Alternatively, the former behavioural
description may very well incorporate particular cognitive
mechanisms, but do so out of the general recognition
among animal behaviour scientists that scientific objectivity
no longer requires a behaviourist’s exclusive commitment
to observation-statements. What is crucial is not that behav-
iour be described in wholly behaviourist terms, but that thespecific cognitive mechanisms under investigation are not
incorporated into behavioural descriptions if the latter are
to serve as evidence for those mechanisms.
What, then, do we mean by ‘behavioural flexibility’? For
present purposes, behavioural flexibility shall be understood
as a distinct type of behavioural plasticity, which in turn is a
distinct type of phenotypic plasticity.2 Nearly all behaviours
are minimally plastic in the sense that they are produced in
response to particular stimuli, and these stimuli are only
sometimes present in the environment. For instance, male
fruit flies universally initiate a rigid sequence of courtship
behaviours only when they detect pheromones emitted by a
receptive female [20]. There is an important sense in which
an organism that can perform a half-dozen behaviours,
even if it does so rigidly in response to stimuli, is more plastic
or versatile than an organism that performs fewer rigid beha-
viours. If we conceive of cognition in information processing
terms, thenwe can already see the beginnings of a robust theor-
etical connection between cognition and behavioural plasticity.
However, only a subset of behaviours are properly plastic—
that is, governed by conditions of expression that allow the
behaviour to be modified in response to environmental
input, and only a subset of properly plastic behaviours are flex-
ible, or modifiable throughout the lifetime of the organism
based on experience.
In essence, then, behavioural flexibility is a special type of
behavioural plasticity in which the rules governing behaviour-
al expression, and thus the behaviours themselves, can be
modified in accordance with environmental input throughout
ontogeny [21].3 It is the alterability of the rules governing
the expression of a behaviour, more so than the fact of
environmental sensitivity per se, that allows organisms to
respond in robustly flexible ways to the vagaries of their
selective environment.4 This notion of behavioural flexibility
is broader than those occasionally found in the literature
(some of which are limited to, e.g. reversal learning),5 and
includes behavioural repertoires that are often elicited in
experiments to probe for complex cognitive abilities such as
vocal learning and causal reasoning.
Not all experiments designed to probe for complex cogni-
tion in animals appear to elicit flexible behaviour in the sense
defined above. For instance, mindreading and self-recognition
experiments do not seem to test for learning abilities at all.
Although some metacognition experiments do not test for
behaviours that exhibit learning in the course of the experiment,
they do test for capacities that are likely to have been learned
through complex interactions with the social and physical
world, and that derive from cognitive mechanisms causally
implicated in flexible behaviours, such as perception-indepen-
dent representations [24] and a sense of agency [25]. We may
therefore regard the behaviours elicited in these experiments
as flexible in an aetiological (diachronic) sense. Nevertheless,
this paper does not intend to establish necessary and sufficient
conditions for the presence of cognitive complexity, nor to pro-
vide an exhaustive account of complex cognition and its
behavioural correlates; rather, its less ambitious aim is to pro-
vide a useful organizing schematic for investigating the link
between cognition and flexible behaviour, which plays an
important evidential role in animal cognition research.
The conceptual decoupling of behavioural flexibility and
cognitive complexity allows the former to serve as meaning-
ful evidence of the latter. Yet this leads directly to another
obstacle that impedes an unproblematic inference from
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Some philosophers of science have suggested that the under-
determination problem is primarily a philosophical concern,
not one that is commonly borne out in the practice of science
[26]. And yet, instances of apparent underdetermination are
common in comparative cognition, with existing behavioural
data appearing to be equally well confirmed by multiple
incompatible cognitive explanations. For present purposes,
it is not necessary to assert that this underdetermination is
permanent or that it will remain unshaken by all possible
sources of experimental evidence. It is enough to show that
underdetermination exists relative to the actual evidence in
hand, that it is pervasive in the science, that it is recurrent
in the sense that equally well-confirmed alternatives are fre-
quently available, and that this undermines our justification
for believing that even our most well-confirmed hypotheses
are true (see [27]).
Consider a well-known example from primatology: the
case of chimpanzee mindreading. Chimpanzees are excellent
predictors of conspecifics’ behaviour, leading researchers to
wonder whether chimpanzees understand that others have
beliefs and desires (i.e. that they are capable of ‘mindreading’).
Decades of studies, however, have resulted in a stalemate:
while some interpret the experimental data as suggesting
that chimpanzees are mindreaders, others note that the data
are consistent with a putatively simpler ‘behaviour-reading’
explanation [28]. For example, according to Vonk & Povinelli
[28], chimpanzees are merely responding to shallow behav-
ioural cues without inferring mental states. Further, they
reason that the experimental data support both mindreading
and behaviour-reading hypotheses equally well, but that the
behaviour-reading hypothesis is simpler, and therefore
better. Philosophers reflecting on this stalemate have expressed
scepticism that it can be resolved empirically (e.g. [29]).
Some comparative cognition theorists reject the assertion
that both mindreading and behaviour-reading hypotheses are
on equal epistemic footing in chimpanzee cognition research.
For instance, Halina [30] argues that mindreading hypotheses
are well tested, whereas behaviour-reading hypotheses are
not actually probed by mindreading experiments. To represent
genuine threats to the mindreading hypothesis, behaviour-
reading hypotheses require independent sources of evidence;
and yet they tend to be offered up ad hoc and then placed on
equal or superior epistemic footing than the mindread-
ing alternative. Halina’s criticism is reminiscent of Gould &
Lewontin’s [31] classic critique of adaptationism, which tar-
geted several argument strategies attributed to the so-called
‘adaptationist programme’. These include (inter alia) the
tendency to readily replace one failed selectionist explana-
tion with another, to have an unwarrantedly low evidential
bar for accepting adaptationist explanations when compa-
red with non-adaptationist ones, and failing to consider
non-adaptationist alternatives at all.
Explanations that advert to lower-level cognitive mechan-
isms substitute for selectionist explanations in the critical
analogy: just as ‘the range of adaptive stories is as wide as
our minds are fertile, (and thus) new stories can always bepostulated’ [31, p. 153], so too can lower-level cognitive expla-
nations be invented for any behavioural datum. Likewise, just
as consistency with natural selection is an inadequate basis for
accepting adaptationist explanations, so too is consistency with
lower-level cognitive explanations an insufficient basis for
rejecting higher-cognitive ones. The key here, as in the evol-
utionary biological context, is to distinguish explanations
that are on strong epistemic footing from among the sizable
set of possible but less well-grounded explanations.
Nevertheless, there is one important element of Gould &
Lewontin’s critique of adaptationism that does not transfer to
the present context: whereas the adaptationist programme
was accused of ignoring non-selectionist explanations, lower-
cognitive explanations are designed specifically to deflate (if
not refute) higher cognitive ones by generating a situation of
underdetermination. This problem of underdetermination is
significantly exacerbated by a general preference for simpler
explanations in comparative cognition, which poses a further
methodological hurdle to establishing an evidential link
between flexible behaviours and complex cognitive mechan-
isms. By a ‘preference for simpler explanations’, we mean the
tendency in comparative cognition to reject higher-level cogni-
tive explanations simply because lower-level ones cannot be
ruled out [32]. In the context of the adaptationist programme
discussed above, the analogous practice would be to reject
any non-selectionist explanation nomatter howwell supported
unless and until all plausible selectionist explanations have
been excluded. In the ‘simplicity programme’ that is widely
(though not universally) embraced in comparative cognition,
putatively simpler hypotheses are treated as theoretical
defaults that experiments must be able to exclude before
more complex cognitive hypotheses can be accepted. In other
words, explanations positing putatively simpler cognitive
mechanisms should, all else being equal, be preferred over
explanations that posit putatively more complex ones—an
idea that is embraced in both comparative cognition [1,33]
and in the psychological sciences more broadly [34]. This
a priori preference for simplicity ‘resolves’ the problem of
underdetermination by offering a clear strategy for choosing
among empirically adequate hypotheses—one that places the
burden of proof on the supposedly more complex hypothesis.
In practice, however, this burden of proof is impossible tomeet,
as deflationary cognitive hypotheses—like their selectionist
analogues—can rarely be ruled out definitively. Thus, the sim-
plicity programme appears to require an unreasonably high
standard of evidence for establishing complex cognitive expla-
nations, and an unwarrantedly low standard of evidence for
accepting putatively simpler ones.
What justifies the simplicity programme in comparative
cognition? Typically, the preference for simpler explanations
is justified by appealing to what is known as ‘Morgan’s
Canon’—a brief passage in a founding text of comparative
psychology by C. Lloyd Morgan, which states:In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of the exer-
cise of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as
the outcome of the exercise of one which stands lower in the
psychological scale (1894: 53).This textbook passage is frequently, though incorrectly, inter-
preted as a version of Occam’s Razor, holding that one ought
to prefer the simplest explanation consistent with the observed
behaviour, barring compelling evidence to the contrary.6
By advising experimenters to select the simplest hypothesis
as the ‘null’, the simplicity preference in effect elides the
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of proof onto explanations that postulate more complex
cognitive mechanisms.
It is far from clear that this is the right way of resolving
the underdetermination problem in comparative cognition,
however, given that the simplicity preference—and thus the
simplicity programme—appears to rest on shaky conceptual,
theoretical and empirical grounds [38,40–46]. Conceptually,
there is no such thing as simplicity simpliciter. Rather, different
scientific contexts call for different approaches to simplification
and, consequently, different justifications of those approaches.
Moreover, simplicity vis-a`-vis explanation is very different
from simplicity vis-a`-vis the entities referred to in those expla-
nations. The fact that a hypothesis is simple (on some
operational semantic metric) does not entail that the entities
that the hypothesis describes are also simple (on some oper-
ational ontological metric). The simplicity of semantic
structures (as measured, e.g. by description length or maxi-
mum compressibility as described in Kolmagorov complexity
theory) need not entail simplicity in the physical structures,
causes or mechanisms postulated by those explanations (as
measured, e.g. by the number of entities or entity types they
feature). Because there appear to be numerous, mutually irre-
ducible ways to simplify the world and our descriptions of it,
we cannot expect all forms of simplification to yield equally
desirable results from a methodological standpoint [46].
Thus, any broad-based preference for simplicity is likely to
be too coarse-grained to be of scientific use.
Theoretically, the operative assumption that biological out-
comes will tend to have simple rather than complex causes
seems particularly ill-suited for the biological world. If natural
selection is more like a historically constrained Rube Goldberg-
style tinkerer, rather than an elegant optimizer [47], then we
should expect functional complexity to be the norm and simpli-
city the exception at all levels of the biological hierarchy.
Models of functional gene regulatory networks, for example,
are typically daunting in their baroque mechanistic complex-
ity. In such cases, causal simplicity is, quite rightly, typically
not a key factor in model adjudication; in fact, the elegance of
biological models will often undermine their real-world appli-
cability [48]. Likewise, in studies of large-scale evolution,
‘stochastic’ models that postulate numerous complexly config-
ured causes have for decades served as the null hypothesis
against which so-called ‘deterministic’ models—those that
postulate a single cause or a few major causes—are tested
[49]. Although optimality models are commonly deployed in
evolutionary biology, they typically serve as idealizations
that allow us to measure the influence of non-selective forces
in evolution [50], rather than arising from a broad ontological
commitment to functional streamlining in nature. As animal
cognition is an evolutionary outcome, it is incumbent on the
defender of the simplicity programme to provide some empiri-
cal justification as to why we should treat cognitive systems
differently from other biological systems in this respect.7
How might such an empirical case proceed? One poten-
tial empirical justification for the simplicity preference
might appeal to the relative evolvability of simpler versus
more complex cognitive solutions. One form of this argu-
ment, which has rarely been made explicit, is what might
be called the ‘metabolic argument’. This holds that natural
selection will, ceteris paribus, tend to favour the most meta-
bolically frugal biological structures among those structures
that can realize the same (or a sufficiently similar) function;further, because complex cognitive mechanisms are more
metabolically demanding than less complex ones (because
they necessitate more metabolically expensive neuroanato-
mical structures), we should err on the side of explanations
that advert to simpler cognitive mechanisms in cases of
underdetermination. Thus, the metabolic argument moves
from an ontological claim that natural selection will tend
to favour metabolically frugal structures among functio-
nally equivalent (or sufficiently similar) alternatives, to the
methodological claim that we should prefer a scientific meth-
odology that biases against findings of cognitive complexity
in circumstances of apparent underdetermination—which,
in effect, is what the simplicity programme in comparative
cognition is designed to do.
The metabolic argument demonstrates one way that
evolutionary theory could potentially informmethods in com-
parative cognition. The argument is problematic, however,
because it relies on claims about evolution in general—and
cognitive evolution in particular—that are either unwarranted
or underdetermined. At the most general biological level, it is
clear that fitness trade-offs associated with the evolution of
more energetic structures often favour metabolic increases.
Indeed, the history of life on Earth is characterized by a
robust trend toward increasingly energetic metabolisms,
structures and lifeways [52]. More to the point, we know that
metabolically costly brains have evolved independently in
a wide range of taxa and that these metabolically costly
structures have been retained in many of the taxa in which
they evolved; further, it is generally presumed that these
metabolically demanding neural structures subserve cognitive
functions. Thus, the selective trade-off between ametabolically
demanding substrate and the perceptual and cognitive gains
it affords is often a favourable one. It follows that simpler cog-
nitive solutions in many cases are not forthcoming because
either (i) they are notmoremetabolically efficient than complex
cognitive ones or (ii) they are more metabolically efficient
but are not functionally equivalent (or sufficiently similar)
alternatives to cognitively complex solutions. We suspect that
both of these factors play a role in the evolution of complex
cognitive mechanisms.
First, it is far from clear that increases in cognitive function
require increases in brain tissue and, correspondingly, increa-
ses in metabolic expenditure. Higher-cognitive solutions
may be achieved simply by repurposing relevant areas of the
brain for novel tasks, leaving the total neural metabolic
budget unchanged. Furthermore, some apparently simple
cognitive tasks, such as association, may require significant
computational and neurological power [53], while some
increases in informational capacity (especially qualitative
ones) may actually reduce per capita metabolic cost. Second,
even if cognitively simpler mechanisms were on average less
metabolically demanding than more complex ones, there is
no reason to suppose that simpler solutions will be functionally
equivalent to more complex ones—and if they are not function-
ally equivalent, then there is no basis for claiming that selection
would prefer simpler over complex cognitive mechanisms
in any given case. Although we can conceive of plausible
lower-cognitive explanations for many observed instances of
behavioural flexibility, this does not mean that the competing
complex and simple cognitive mechanisms that could account
for these instances of behavioural flexibility are themselves
functionally equivalent. This is because each competing cogni-
tive mechanism will be associated with a range of behaviours
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be equivalent. In other words, a behaviour witnessed in an iso-
lated experimental setting may be part of a wide repertoire of
behaviours underwritten by a complex cognitive mechanism,
and taken as a whole this behavioural output range may have
a higher relative fitness value than that produced by a compar-
ably simpler cognitive mechanism. Therefore, the fact that a
simpler cognitive mechanism can explain an isolated case of be-
havioural flexibility as competently as a more complex
cognitive mechanism does not mean that, from an evolutionary
standpoint, the two solutions are functionally equivalent—and
thus there is no sound evolutionary basis for preferring the sim-
pler one. In sum, there are simply too many unanswered
questions and too many unfounded evolutionary assumptions
here for ametabolic rationale to support a robust, context-insen-
sitive, course-grainedmethodological bias against explanations
that advert to more complex cognitive mechanisms.
However, the metabolic argument is not the only evolutio-
nary argument that could support the simplicity programme.
Another, which might be called ‘the fast and the frugal’ argu-
ment, focuses on the comparative performance advantages of
simple over more complex forms of cognition irrespective of
their metabolic requirements. For example, simple strategies
have been shown to outperform more complex cognitive strat-
egies in decision-making and problem-solving contexts in
terms of both speed and accuracy [54]. These fast and frugal
strategies work when the environment is structured such that
it can be easily exploited for the rapid retrieval of ecologically
relevant information. This is the case, for example, when the
environment contains stable and relatively simple patterns
that organisms are capable of detecting and which support
simple heuristics; it may also be the case in unpredictable,
noisy and/or complexly configured environments (such as
stock markets) in which tracking a small set of salient cues
(such as the behaviour ofwell-known stocks)may be a superior
strategy to complex optimizing models that search for patterns
among all available information [55]. If fast and frugal
strategies are adaptive, then at least when environments are
appropriately structured, we should expect organisms to
evolve such cognitive shortcuts, rather than investing in
slower and perhaps less reliable general-purpose mechanisms.
Taken to its methodological conclusion, the fast and the frugal
argument asserts that scientists ought to privilege explanations
that advert to simple heuristics (such as feature extraction) over
those that postulate more complex cognitive mechanisms
whenever experimental evidence supports both explana-
tions equally well. This, in turn, would allow the simplicity
preference to act as a rational tie-breaker in cases of underdeter-
mination, and provide a strong corrective even in cases where
the evidence in favour of amore complex cognitivemechanism
begins to mount.
As with the metabolic argument, the fast and the frugal
argument cannot justify a blanket preference for simpler
explanations. First, the argument only holds for lineages
whose environment is appropriately informationally struc-
tured; at present, however, we do not know how pervasive
such informational ecologies are—or how applicable some
of the human-focused cases, such as the stock market, are
to the ecologies of other organisms. Thus, our current state
of knowledge does not support a sweeping preference for
simpler cognitive explanations by way of the fast and the
frugal rationale. Second, even if an animal tends to make
use of simple heuristics in some cases, it may still be capableof switching to a more cumbersome cognitive strategy that it
keeps in reserve for situations in which simple heuristics fail
or are silent. For instance, while a student may not typically
reason using predicate logic, she may switch to logical
reasoning when faced with writing a philosophy paper.
Similarly, a rat may toggle between simple rules and
metacognitive strategies, or a bee may toggle between
feature extraction and template matching. In sum, while it
may be reasonable to say that ceteris paribus, natural selec-
tion will tend to favour simpler cognitive mechanisms, so
many evolutionary, ecological and developmental assump-
tions are packed into the ‘ceteris paribus’ clause that the
statement is, if not vacuous, then far too course-grained to
license an evidential burden of proof in any given case.
Not all empirical justifications of the simplicity preference
will appeal to evolutionary considerations, however. It might
be argued, for example, that simpler explanations (e.g. behav-
iour reading) are on stronger epistemic grounds than their
more complex alternatives (e.g. mindreading) because we
already know that the animals in question have the simpler
ability but we are not certain that they have the more complex
one. This line of reasoning is, in fact, circular: it draws upon
an evidence base that was itself established by methods that
may have privileged the simpler hypothesis [38]. In other
words, because many experiments have followed the simpli-
city programme, much of the evidence for cognitive abilities
may be skewed toward simpler explanations, and this
possibility should weaken our confidence in the simpler
alternative. In any case, this rationale turns not on comparative
simplicity, but on pre-existing evidence that some explanato-
rily adequate capacity is present in a given lineage while the
existence of another explanatorily adequate capacity is less cer-
tain. Thus, on this empirical rationale, simplicity does none of
the adjudicatory work.
For all these reasons, a strong a priori simplicity preference
is not a preferable solution to the underdetermination
problem. As Elliott Sober [56] and Simon Fitzpatrick [42,57]
have argued, the only legitimate tie-breaker when experimen-
tal data cannot adjudicate among competing hypotheses is
more evidence. The burden of proof should favour not the
simplest hypothesis, but the best evidenced hypothesis.
This can be accomplished by modifying the null hypothesis
so as to build into it probability-conferring evidence [58].
Such evidence would include not only prior experimental
evidence but also evolutionary, phylogenetic, ecological,
neurobiological, developmental and behavioural data about
the species in question. Thus, a more promising solution to
the underdetermination problem in comparative cognition—
and the most plausible way of establishing an evidential link
between flexible behaviour and complex cognition—involves
looking to evidence outside of the experimental context. Put
differently, it entails shifting our focus from the ‘context of dis-
covery’, in which external evidence has no power to adjudicate
among hypotheses, to the ‘context of justification’, in which all
relevant bits of evidence are factored into the null hypothesis
(or prior probability) that bears on a given conclusion. In
essence, comparative cognition would benefit by diversifying
its methodology, drawing upon disparate streams of evidence,
and correcting for a priori biases toward simplicity that have
biased experimental work against findings of complex cogni-
tion and thus shaped all-things-considered judgements about
the nature of cognition and its phylogenetic distribution.
What would this extra-experimental evidence base look like,
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might it substantiate a link between behavioural flexibility
and complex cognition? Sketching a preliminary answer to
this three-part question is the task of the next section.lsocietypublishing.org
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model of cognitive-behavioural evolution
Our aim in this section is to outline a model that demonstrates
how evidence in evolutionary biology can support the infer-
ence from behavioural flexibility to cognitive complexity,
and thereby bear on theory adjudication in comparative
cognition science. A broad-scale picture of macroevolution
suggests that the emergence of increasingly flexible behaviour
in animals is closely tied to the evolution of complex infor-
mation processing mechanisms realized by nervous systems.
On the most plausible reconstructions of metazoan evolution,
cognitive complexity has arisen independently in groups as
developmentally diverse as vertebrates, molluscs and arthro-
pods [59]—clades that boast complex image-forming sensory
capabilities and central nervous system functions that support
rich sensorimotor information flows, which in turn under-
write the most rapid, sophisticated and flexible behavioural
repertoires in the living world.
The theoretical foundations of this non-accidental regu-
larity can be found in Godfrey-Smith’s [21] ‘environmental
complexity thesis’, which holds that the evolutionary function
of cognition is to enable organisms to interact in fitness-enhan-
cing ways with a heterogeneous environment (see also [60]).8
Cognitive processes do this, on Godfrey-Smith’s account, by
exploiting ecologically relevant information. Cognition only
gets its purchase, therefore, when there is both heterogeneity
in the environment and reliable cues of ecologically relevant
variations. Despite its theoretical plausibility, the environ-
mental complexity thesis is difficult to test, in part because
the concept of heterogeneity is difficult to define and opera-
tionalize. As Godfrey-Smith concedes, it is unlikely that we
will be able to articulate a general definition of environmental
heterogeneity that is both testable and permits cross-taxa
comparisons. For example, we may be able to compare the
relative environmental heterogeneity for honeybees to that
of mosquitos, because both are flying insects, even if we
cannot do so between more distantly related species such
as monitor lizards and hummingbirds. In this respect, the
environmental complexity thesis is akin to the principle of
natural selection: an organizing schematic that helps to
unify (and thereby explain) a wide range of cases, but one
that is not testable until lineage-specific ecological, develop-
mental and evolutionary parameters are filled in [8]. For
present purposes, we will rely on the following provisional
understanding of environmental heterogeneity:Environment A of evolving lineage X is more heterogeneous than
environment B of evolving lineage Y only if A contains more
fitness-relevant informational cues in relation to X (given the
developmental parameters of X) than B does in relation to Y
(given the developmental parameters of Y).Here, ‘fitness-relevant informational cues’ refers to informa-
tional cues that would, if detected and acted upon, have
some net statistical effect on organismic fitness. For example,
an animal’s social environment is more heterogeneous the
more types of calls, postures and conspecific interactions it
needs to keep track of. Fitness-relevant informationalcues are indexed to the evolutionary developmental par-
ameters of particular lineages to acknowledge a degree of
organism–environment codetermination, wherein the orga-
nismic features of lineages actively shape their selective
environments [8,62].
On the adaptive model of cognitive-behavioural evolution
that we propose, complex cognitive mechanisms will fail to
evolve, or, if they already exist, begin to degrade due to the
relaxation of stabilizing selection, in environments where
either: (i) there are few fitness-relevant informational cues,
(ii) there are many fitness-relevant informational cues, but
cheaper solutions (such as camouflage or simple cogni-
tive heuristics) are readily accessible, or (iii) there are many
fitness-relevant informational cues but some evolvability con-
straint (resulting, e.g. from the lack of a nervous or motor
system, a prohibitive trade-off, or a complexly configured/
dynamic informational environment that makes it difficult to
extract relevant cues) prevents the requisite phenotypic vari-
ations from arising. Conversely, we may expect that, ceteris
paribus, behavioural flexibility will arisewhen animal lifeways
incentivize the detection and processing of a wide range
of informational cues whose natures and sources vary substan-
tially over space and time. For instance, if a generalist predator
is confronted with prey types that vary widely over time and
geographical range, they will, barring constraints, tend to
develop flexible strategies of predation, which will sometimes
be underwritten by more complex cognitive mechanisms. By
contrast, lineages that utilize only one or a few stable environ-
mental resources—such as many grazing herbivores, be they
arthropods or vertebrates—can be expected to process compar-
ably less information about their environment, and as a result
will tend to exhibit more rigid behaviours and comparably
simple neural machinery (e.g. grasshoppers, sauropods,
bovids, koalas, etc.).
On Godfrey-Smith’s view, the environmental complexity
thesis serves as a model that can be applied on a case-
by-case basis and, if it provides a successful account of the
evolution of cognition in numerous instances, then it may
be generalized to a still broader range of cases. We propose
something similar in working toward an account of the
wider evidential context in which competing hypotheses in
comparative cognition may be adjudicated. According
to what we will call the ‘adaptive triadic model’ of
cognitive-behavioural evolution (henceforth ‘ATM’), three
elements—behavioural flexibility, environmental heterogen-
eity and the neuroanatomical structures associated with
increasingly sophisticated information processing—serve as
conceptually independent and mutually reinforcing sources
of evidence that indicate the presence of cognitive mechan-
isms generally regarded as complex. This information can
then be incorporated into the null hypothesis or prior prob-
abilities against which experimental data are weighed.
When taken in isolation, observations of behavioural flexi-
bility have limited evidentiary power; once other
components of the ATM are included, however, the weight
of behavioural flexibility as a source of evidence for cognitive
complexity increases substantially. The effect of incorporating
these other sources of evidence is not to lighten the evidential
load that behavioural flexibility is expected to bear, but rather
to strengthen it. In other words, the ability of behavioural
flexibility to serve as strong evidence of complex cognition
is context-sensitive, and this context is provided by other
components of the ATM. Behavioural flexibility continues
rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org
Interface
Focus
7:20160121
9
 on April 21, 2017http://rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from to play a special evidential role, however, as inferences of
cognitive complexity will generally be untenable if they are
not supported by any behavioural observations whatsoever
(though neurological and ecological data could provide
grounds for further behavioural investigation).
While elements of the ATM serve as conceptually indepen-
dent sources of evidence for cognitive complexity, they are not
causally independent of one another—indeed, it is precisely in
virtue of their evolutionary casual interdependence that they
have predictive power. More precisely, what gives the ATM
traction is the idea that the convergent evolution of trait–
environment pairings in phylogenetically disparate groups of
organisms can constitute ‘natural experiments’ [63] that sup-
port the existence of non-accidental (or law-like) regularities,
which in turn can be used to inform work in comparative cog-
nition. Convergent evolution is considered among the
strongest evidence for adaptive hypotheses [64]: for instance,
the fact that both ichthyosaurs (Mesozoic marine reptiles)
and dolphins independently evolved dorsal and tail fins in a
fully aquatic environment strongly suggests that these struc-
tures are adaptive and that they have similar evolutionary
functions in each case. Currie [65,66] provides a helpful sche-
matic for such an inference, according to which a known
pattern of convergence enables us to project a certain trait com-
bination observed in a ‘model’ lineage onto a ‘target’ lineage
that is known to exhibit some (but not all) of the traits in the
model cluster. What allows for this projectibility, Currie
suggests, depends on the relation between the model and
target lineages. In the case of homology (ancestral similarity)
relations, trait inferences are justified by the reliable inheritance
of developmentally interconnected characters: if certain com-
plex cognitive mechanisms are shown to be present in one
lineage, then they may be inferred to exist in a closely related
lineage, unless additional evidence suggests otherwise. In the
case of convergence, trait inferences are justified by a biological
regularity caused by a shared selection regime or other
common forces that are ‘external’ to the lineages in question.
Given this inferential schematic, convergent regularities
enable us to infer certain traits on the basis of particular selective
environments, certain selective environments from the presence
of particular traits, and certain traits from the existence of other
traits in a non-accidental trait cluster given a particular selective
environment. For instance, saywe know that dorsal fins and tail
fins form an iterated (convergent) trait cluster in connection
with fully aquatic vertebrate lifestyles, such that we can
expect to find dorsal fins in a new species of marine vertebrate
if we know that it has tail fins. The ATM is premised on a simi-
larly robust convergent regularity, in this case one that includes
broadly defined behavioural traits, their proximate cognitive
causes, the neural signature of these proximate causes described
at an appropriate grain of resolution,9 and a heterogeneous
selective environment that poses design problems to which
behavioural flexibility is a solution.
The fact that elements of the ATM are historically causally
interdependent does not mean that they are conceptually
intertwined in a way that undermines their ability to support
inferences concerning synchronic cognitive capacities. For
instance, how heterogeneous an environment is will be
determined in part by the sensory modalities, cognitive
capacities and neurological structures of the lineage in ques-
tion. As lineages evolve in cognitive (including perceptual)
sophistication, so too does the extent and type of envi-
ronmental heterogeneity they encounter. Acknowledgingthat the developmental parameters of lineages shape their
selective environments does not pose conceptual or methodo-
logical problems for assessing environmental heterogeneity
[8] or for allowing neurological and ecological data to serve
as evidence of cognitive complexity by way of the ATM clus-
ter. In fact, elements of the ATM are likely to evolve in
feedback with one another: the emergence of novel cognitive
abilities may open up ecological opportunities that increase
the total number of fitness-relevant informational cues,
which in turn drive the evolution of more sophisticated
neural structures and cognitive mechanisms in ratchet-like
fashion (see [43]).
The more the ATM regularity holds across distant animal
groups with disparate developmental plans, the less likely it
is to be the product of chance or quirky features of particular
groups, and the greater the likelihood that the traits cluster
together non-accidentally due to forces or constraints that are
external to the converging lineages. Unlike projections based
on homology relations, which are generally limited to closely
related taxa, the ATM permits inferences across large expanses
of the tree of life. This is particularly important in the case of
comparative cognition, because centralized or otherwise mas-
sively augmented information processing centres have arisen
independently numerous times in protostomes and deuteros-
tomes, and thus any regularities that subsume these cases
cannot be grounded in (or solely in) homology. Although
these iterated outcomes are produced in part by conserved
developmental resources, such as deep homologues, cell
types and/or patterning mechanisms that were likely present
in the ancestor of Bilateria, the neural proliferation and much
of the architectural organization that characterizes these
events is convergent [69].
If the ATM is correct, then we should find evidence of
the hypothesized trait–environment cluster across phylo-
genetically distant linages. Indeed, there is a growing body of
evidence linking the enlargement and/or increase in neuron
density of brain regions that are causally associated with infor-
mational integration in mammals (the cortex including the
neocortex and striatum), birds (the telencephalon including
the neostriatum and hyperstriatum ventrale), octopuses
(the vertical lobe) and insects (the mushroom bodies) to
problem-solving abilities that evolved in the context of hetero-
geneous selective environments (table 1) [4,87,88]. Further
phylogenetically broad evidence, gathered in table 1, supports
these findings.
An additional source of evidence for theATMcomes from a
similar regularity in ontogeny: cases where complex cognition,
flexible behaviour and neuroanatomical complexification
correlate with fluctuations in environmental heterogeneity
within the lifetime of an organism. For instance, London taxi
drivers who must navigate a spatially heterogeneous environ-
ment enjoy better-than-average spatial navigation abilities, and
have been found to have a correspondingly larger posterior
hippocampus relative to average humans [89] (for other
examples see [90–102]). Although this pattern is ontogenetic,
it supports the ATM for two reasons. First, it shows that hetero-
geneous environments call for more flexible behaviours and
that these, in turn, require additional neuronal growth. If this
link is present in ontogeny, we can expect natural selection to
also exploit the link over evolutionary time. Second, the mech-
anisms through which the ATM is established at evolutionary
scales could exploit some of these ontogenetic effects.
This could occur, for example, through a process of ‘genetic
Table 1. Support for the adaptive triadic model from examples where similar data were collected on closely related species. Species that demonstrate better
problem-solving abilities had more opportunities to learn from previous experience ( ﬂexibility; italics) through a more heterogeneous environment (bold
italics), and show enlargements in causally related brain structures (bold).
taxa species description of species comparison
mammal Pan troglodytes, Papio anubis chimpanzees are better at solving spatial and tool use tasks, have a larger
neocortex relative to their total brain size, and their arboreal lifestyle
results in a more heterogeneous environment than ground-dwelling olive
baboons [70–72]
mammal Crocuta crocuta, Parahyaena brunnea, Hyaena hyaena,
Proteles cristata
spotted hyenas can solve a puzzle box that striped hyenas cannot, and they
have the most complex social system, hunt the largest prey, and
have the largest anterior cerebrum volume (part of the frontal cortex)
[73,74]
bird Molothrus bonariensis, M. rufoaxillaris, M. badius brood parasitic screaming and shiny cowbirds have larger hippocampuses
than non-brood parasitic bay-winged cowbirds, probably because brood
parasites need better spatial memory to remember where host nests
are and when they might be ready for parasitic eggs to be laid.
Female shiny cowbirds had larger hippocampuses than male shiny
cowbirds, probably because only the female searches for nests in this
species. There were no sex differences in hippocampuses or search
behaviour in screaming cowbirds [75]
bird Ailuroedus crassirostris, Scenopoeetes dentirostris,
Prionodura newtonia, Ptilonorhynchus violaceus,
Chlamydera nuchalis
bower building species had larger telencephalons (minus the
hippocampus) than the non-bower building catbird. Among bower
building species, bower complexity increased with cerebellum size
(responsible for motor learning [76]). Catbirds feed their offspring fruit
(mostly ﬁgs) rather than insects as the other species do, and the fruits
the bower building species rely on are patchily distributed in the non-
breeding season [77]
ﬁsh Bathygobius cocosensis, B. krefftii, Favonigobius
lentiginosus, Istigobius hoesei
rock dwelling gobies (Cocos frillgoby and Krefft’s goby) learned a spatial
task faster, made fewer errors [78], and have larger telencephalons
[79] than sand-dwelling gobies (eastern long-ﬁnned goby and Hoese’s
sandgoby)
ﬁsh Labroides dimidiatus, compared with 24 other species
in the same order
the cleaner wrasse ﬁsh engages in complex social interactions driven by
repeat interactions with the same clients (ﬁsh that the cleaner wrasse
clean), and has one of the largest diencephalons (one of the brain
regions responsible for social decision-making) compared with 24 other
species in the order Perciformes [80,81])
insect Apis melifera, Bombus impatiens bumblebees originated in the temperate latitudes where ﬂowers are more
patchily dispersed than in the tropics where honeybees originated.
Bumblebees socially learn about nectar robbing and can adaptively
reverse a previously learned preference, while honeybees do neither [82].
Bumblebees have larger relative mushroom bodies than honeybees
[83]
cephalopod Nautilus pompilius, octopus, cuttleﬁsh octopus and cuttleﬁsh have excellent spatial navigation abilities, short and
long-term memory in associative learning tasks, their brains have
vertical lobes (where learning and memory are processed), and they
are highly mobile and pursue mobile, patchily distributed prey when
compared with the nautilus which has poor long-term memory, lacks
vertical lobes, and forages by scavenging [84–86]
rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org
Interface
Focus
7:20160121
10
 on April 21, 2017http://rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org
Interface
Focus
7:20160121
11
 on April 21, 2017http://rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from assimilation’ whereby plastic phenotypic variation becomes
environmentally canalized so that it comes to be produced
without the environmental stimulus.
If the ATM is borne out empirically, then behavioural flexi-
bility could serve as evidence of cognitive complexity for
lineages that evolved in heterogeneous selective environments
and exhibit relevant neural structural variations. The ATM
could also justify treating a cognitively complex hypothesis
as the null against which putatively simpler cognitive expla-
nations bear the burden of proof. By contrast, where critical
traits in the cluster are lacking—such as the relevant neuroana-
tomical correlates, environmental heterogeneity or behavioural
flexibility—inferences to or methodological biases in favour
of cognitive complexity will be on shakier grounds. In con-
junction with inferentially rich homology data [103], the
ATM offers a promising source of evidence beyond the labor-
atory that can inform methods and theory adjudication in
comparative cognition research.
There is a potentially important disanalogy, however,
between the evidential schematic presented by Currie [66]
and the kind of inference-making contemplated here. In Cur-
rie’s model of inference, observed phenotypic traits of a model
lineage are projected onto a target lineage on the basis of their
homologous or convergent relations to the target. By contrast,
the present case involves traits—cognitive mechanisms—that
have never been directly observed in any animal lineage.
Thus, we are projecting an unobservable trait inferred in a
model lineage onto a target lineage. This is appropriate, how-
ever, because the projectibility of a given trait in any trait
cluster–environment regularity hinges not ondirect observabil-
ity of the trait, but rather on our epistemic warrant for believing
that the trait exists in model lineages. The fact that cognitive
sophistication is not directly observable need not be a problem
for ourmodel, so long as cognitive complexity has been reliably
inferred in a sufficiently large number of cases.
Another concern may be that the ATM is viciously circular
insofar as each source of evidence lends independent weight to
the others. How can trait X be evidence of trait Y, Y be evidence
of trait Z, and Z be evidence of X, without circularity? The
answer is simple: what grounds inferences such as ‘If X, then
(probably) Y’ where X and Y are non-accidentally clustering
traits is that they both stem from a common cause. In some
cases, this common cause is inheritance from a common ances-
tor. In the case of the ATM, the common cause is selection in a
broadly common ecological regime, along with structural and
physiological constraints on the ways that complex cognitive
solutions can be realized [69,104]. For the same reason, the
inference ‘If X, Y and Z then (probably) environment E’ may
be justified where E is a common cause of X, Y and Z.
There are two additional circularityworries that are not dis-
patched by the above common cause argument. The first is that
the ATM may be used to generate evidence in its own favour,
leading to a circularity problem analogous to that of the simpli-
city programme (§3), wherein the results of a biased method
are used to justify the method’s bias. The worry is that if
future research employs the ATM in order to identify complex
cognition, then it will bias findings in favour of cognitive com-
plexity, which could then illicitly be used to bolster the ATM
regularity. However, the ATM does not bias research in
favour of complex cognition attributions; to the contrary, it
can serve as evidence both for and against findings of complex
cognitive abilities on a case by case basis, depending on which
features of the cluster are present (or absent). For instance,where flexible behaviour is found in the absence of a hetero-
geneous environment and relevant neural underpinnings, the
ATM cautions against hasty attributions of complex cognition.
The model therefore does not import a context-insensitive bias
in favour of cognitive complexity in theway that the simplicity
programme does for simpler cognitive mechanisms. Another
circularity worry is that findings of cognitive complexity
involve inferences to unobservable entities, and these unobser-
vables are not directly supported by the ATM, as the latter
only licenses inferences from one observable feature of the
cluster to another. This concern can be put to rest as well by
noting that the evidence drawn upon in support of the ATM,
which is enough to get the model off the ground, is derived
not from ATM-licensed inferences, but from experimental
findings that were arrived at in an epistemic environment
that was, methodologically speaking, quite hostile to find-
ings of complex cognition. Thus, support for the ATM does
not come from the ATM itself, and hence the model is not
problematically circular.
One might further query whether an evolutionary account
like the ATM, which identifies an aetiological regularity, sits at
the wrong level of explanation when it comes to identifying
the proximate mechanisms at work in animal cognition. It is
true that if we had a full understanding of the synchronic
causal structure of cognition and could reliably infer this struc-
ture from neural anatomy and/or behaviour, we would have
no need to draw upon diachronic information provided by
evolutionary regularities like the ATM. But such an under-
standing, if attainable, lies well beyond the horizon of our
present knowledge. Disciplines working under conditions of
substantially incomplete information—which is the case with
comparative cognition/neuroscience as much as it is with
historical sciences like palaeontology—should engage in
what Currie [105] calls ‘methodological omnivory’. This entails
making use of all epistemic resources at our disposal to develop
theories about phenomena that are not directly observable. In
the case of comparative cognition, methodological omnivory
involves looking beyond the epistemic confines of behavioural
experiment, and drawing on evolutionary concepts and
methods tomake inferences, inform hypothesis testing, adjudi-
cate theories and delineate the functions of brain structures.
This is precisely what the ATM is designed to do.
While the preliminary evidence in table 1 supports the
ATM, there are also cases that appear to contradict it. For
instance, the giant panda enjoys a monotonous foraging
ecology that requires relatively little information processing,
suggesting that panda brains should be proportionally small
and simple; yet, the panda boasts a larger than predicted
brain size for its body size [106]. Such cases may present as
counterexamples to the ATM until one realizes that (i) the
ATM describes only statistical, not absolute, regularities,
(ii) some putative counterexamples, on closer inspection, turn
out to be consistent with the ATM, and (iii) the ATM obtains
at courser grains of phylogenetic and neuroanatomical resol-
ution and may break down at finer grains because it becomes
swamped by historical factors (such as phylogenetic inertia,
as discussed below).
The first point is that, as with other postulatedmechanisms
and regularities in evolutionary biology, theATM is a statistical
thesis rather than an invariant, exceptionless law—and thus it
is not refuted by a small number of counterexamples. The key
question is not one of existence but of relative significance [47].
The second point is that some glaring counterexamples to
Box 1. Case example. Hunting behaviour of the Portia jumping spider.
Goal: Suppose that wewish to understand how Portia fimbriata succeeds in hunting a larger web-building spider, Zosis genicularis.
Selecting a null hypothesis: We must first select a ‘contextual null’ hypothesis—i.e. one that draws on background theoretical
and empirical knowledge [58,115]. This requires looking beyond controlled experimental data to consider what the ATM pre-
dicts in the case of Portia. In this case, we know that jumping and wolf spiders have the largest supraesophageal ganglions
(where learning and memory occur) of the arachnids ([116] in [117]), and that they operate in a heterogeneous environment
because they primarily hunt other spiders, which have diverse behavioural routines and are patchily distributed. This gives
us reason to expect them to exhibit behavioural flexibility underwritten by complex cognitive abilities. We also know that jump-
ing spiders have excellent vision compared to other spiders [118] and that Portia is the most versatile spider genus in terms of its
predatory behaviour: it hunts in the open, makes prey-capturewebs, and, unique among spiders, it can use others’ webs to hunt
spider prey [119].We also know something about the predatory behaviour of P. fimbriata: namely, that it waits untilZ. genicularis
is busy wrapping up an insect prey before moving across the web to attack it [118]. When Z. genicularis is wrapping its prey, it is
less responsive to external movements on its web as well as to tactile stimulation, and P. fimbriata capitalizes on this unrespon-
siveness. Using vision to detect when Z. genicularis is wrapping prey, it times its approach with the prey wrapping behaviour,
attacking the Z. genicularis when it is most vulnerable [118].
Null hypothesis and burden of proof: The traditional null hypothesis is insensitive to background evolutionary and ecological
information and recommends selecting the simplest plausible hypothesis as the default. Here, this may mean assuming that
Z. genicularis prey wrapping behaviour cues P. fimbriata to move (approach and attack) and that the association between prey
wrapping behaviour and walking is nothing more than simple cue-recognition. However, this choice of null ignores predictions
made by theATM. Instead,wemay propose a contextual null hypothesis, onwhich P. fimbriata tracks not simple cues but the atten-
tional states of Z. genicularis, allowing it to time its movements with prey wrapping behaviour. Knowing when Z. genicularis is
distracted would allow P. fimbriata to update its movement behaviour flexibly (e.g. detect and predict when the prey wrapping
behaviour will finish and switch tactics if prey wrapping ends when P. fimbriata is in the middle of the web) and in different
contexts (e.g. not only during preywrapping behaviour). Because there is reason to suspect relatively complex forms of cognition
in P. fimbriata, the contextual null hypothesis shifts the burden of proof onto the ‘simpler’ explanations, which may posit innate
rules or learned behaviours that do not involve tracking attentional states of their prey.
Testing the contextual null hypothesis: The rationale behind selecting a contextual null hypothesis is that it is the best evidenced,
and hence most likely to be true. For this reason, it is unnecessary to rule out alternatives to the contextual null even when these
alternatives are simpler, though it does of course remain necessary to put the hypothesis to experimental test. In our example,
onewould need to testwhether it is simply the onset and endof preywrappingmovements that initiate and terminateP. fimbriata
movements. If initiation and termination of walking and preywrapping are coordinated significantlymore than expected by the
contextual null, then this should decrease our confidence in the truth of the contextual null. On the other hand, if initiation and
termination events are not significantly coordinated, then the contextual null hypothesis should be retained.
Simplicity and the contextual null: Although the contextual null hypothesis for the P. fimbriata in this example is arguably
more complex than the traditional null hypothesis, the ATM may have issued a different recommendation had the back-
ground information been different. For instance, if P. fimbriata had been known to inhabit a homogeneous environment
and had relatively small supraesophageal ganglions, the ATM would have recommended a simpler hypothesis, such as
cue-recognition, as the null.
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brain hypothesis [107], which predicts that heterogeneous
social structures tend to lead to evolutionary increases in
brain size that underwrite behavioural flexibility, which
enables organisms to navigate their complex, variable social
landscapes. Although there is empirical support for this
hypothesis,10 there are also apparent counter-examples.
Consider the surprising finding that highly social ants and
bees are no more encephalized than their solitary wasp ances-
tors [108]. We can infer from phylogenetic and fossil data that
the markedly encephalized mushroom bodies of hymenop-
tera evolved many millions of years prior to the emergence
of eusociality in these groups [109]; similar patterns are
seen in the evolution of eusocial termites, which exhibit
significant reductions in brain complexity as compared to
their asocial, generalist-foraging cockroach ancestors [110].
These findings seem to cut against the social brain hypothesis
and by implication the ATM, until one realizes two things.
First, encephalized mushroom bodies in hymenopterans
arose in central-place foraging parasitoid wasps whose
heterogeneous ecology required greatly expanded spatialmemory and learning capacities—enhanced information-
processing capacities that may have been subsequently
coopted for the complexities of eusocial living and, as a
result, did not require additional encephalization. Second,
the evolution of highly specialized eusocial insect colonies
reflects the emergence of a new evolutionary individual,
which in some cases will entail reduced ecological heterogen-
eity for members of specialized castes and, thus, not result in
an increase in neural architecture [111]. Indeed, the evolution
of individuality is characterized by the specialization of parts
within the individual (via, e.g. epigenetic modification),
which results in a reduction of functional complexity within
those parts because many functions can now be offloaded
onto the larger collective [112]. So what looks initially like
an exception to the ATM can in fact be accommodated by
the model.
The third point is that other apparent exceptions to the
ATM can be explained by ‘phyletic inertia’, or constraints
on future evolutionary directions imposed by earlier body
plan adaptations [31]. For example, the panda’s anomalously
large brain size (mentioned above) is probably due to the
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Ursidae—adopted its derived, ecologically homogeneous life-
style. We might expect a similar anomalous pattern for other
secondarily herbivorous clades, such as therizinosaur thero-
pod dinosaurs and the jumping spider Bagheera kiplingi. This
example illustrates anotherway inwhich diachronic evolution-
ary theory can help inform synchronic understandings of
animal cognition: the panda’s homogeneous environment,
coupled with the principle of phyletic inertia, allows us to pre-
dict that the giant panda may not be utilizing its large brain in
the same way its ancestors did, even if some neural (and per-
haps cognitive) vestiges of that evolutionary history remain
due to homology. Thus, neurobiological evidence alone, at
least in anything approaching its current grain of resolution,
does not provide high powered predictions of the extant cogni-
tive abilities of clades—we need to supplement these datawith
aetiological and ecological information.
Another concern about the model proposed here is that
it is too abstract, or the regularity it describes too course-
grained, to inform any specific cases in comparative
cognition. It is true that the ATM does not, on its own
accord, provide evidence for the presence of particular cogni-
tive mechanisms. Nor does it predict precisely which sorts of
flexible behaviours were selected for in any given case.
Although the selective pressures underlying the convergent
evolution of neural circuits that subserve specialized sensory
functions may readily be identified, it is difficult to determine
the selective causes of convergent elaborations of neuro-
anatomy that could subserve functions for complex
cognition. However, this is not the evidential use to which
the model is intended to be put. Rather, the ATM merely
licenses the inference that some complex cognitive mechan-
isms have evolved; this then supports, over rival simpler
cognitive explanations, the complex cognitive mechanism
that best explains the behavioural data in any given case,
which then informs the choice of a null hypothesis.
Finally, onemightworry that too little is known about com-
parative neuroanatomy to make any bold claims about the
physical substrates of cognitive complexity. We agree that
one must be cautious when drawing on apparent neuroanato-
mical analogies, as data are indeed sparse formany species and
the means of mapping cognition onto brains is notoriously
difficult.11 However, the ATM will hopefully stimulate
further research and is open to adjustments in its neuroanato-
mical parameters as novel data are incorporated and concepts
and methods are refined. Where enough is known about the
organism in question, the ATM may aid experimental work
in comparative cognition by informing the choice of an
appropriate null hypothesis, as illustrated in box 1.5. Conclusion
The convergent coevolution of flexible behaviours and
higher brainarchitectures—andperhaps similar cognitivemech-
anisms—indistant phyla in response to broadly similar selection
regimes, suggests that there may be a limited number of ways
that nervous systems can be configured so as to produce flexible
behaviour as a means for coping with heterogeneous, informa-
tionally demanding selective environments [104]. If the ATM
proves to be robust, then it may serve as a theoretical buttress
for the common and consequential assumption that flexible
behaviour is evidence of complex cognition, while helping toovercome underdetermination problems and a priori simplicity
preferences in comparative cognition in a way that is conducive
to knowledge production. Establishing the presence of complex
cognitive mechanisms in phylogenetically diverse lineages
requires that we look beyond controlled experiment—and
even beyond behavioural data—to draw upon a more diverse
set of scientific methods and evidential sources. In short, it
requires bringing the field of comparative cognition and its
underlying subject matter—cognition itself—further under the
ecological and evolutionary umbrella of biology.
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1Although Shettleworth’s account of cognition posits domain-specific
cognitive architecture, there is nothing inherent to an information
processing account that requires domain specificity; to the contrary,
such accounts are consistent with some types of cognition involving
domain-general information processing.
2‘Phenotypic plasticity’ refers to the developmental modifiability of
organismic traits in response to environmental inputs. For mor-
phology, developmental sensitivity to environmental inputs is
generally limited to earlier phases of ontogeny and has largely irre-
versible effects. By contrast, behaviours can retain their flexibility
throughout ontogeny. As West-Eberhard [19, p. 30] puts it, there
is more potential for ontogenetic reorganization of behavioural
subunits than there is for morphological or physiological ones.
3This view broadly maps on to Godfrey-Smith’s [21] useful distinc-
tion between ‘first-order plasticity’, which he defines as
changeability in the organism’s state, and ‘second-order plasticity’,
which he defines as changeability of ‘the rules or conditionals that
govern the organism’s changes of state’.
4For example, subordinate chimpanzees competing with dominants
for food flexibly adjust their behaviour according to the knowledge
state of the dominant [22]. Subordinates preferred food items that
the dominant had not seen placed in the experimental room during
baiting, as well as items that were moved after the dominant saw
their initial placement. Subordinates were also sensitive to which
dominant watched the baiting process: if the knowledgeable domi-
nant was replaced with an uninformed dominant, subordinates
preferred to take food items in front of the uninformed rather than
the informed dominant. Chimpanzees showed behavioural flexibility
because they learned to modify their behaviour in a new context
based on their previous experience with hierarchical relationships
in the group. This demonstration of behavioural flexibility and
others like it have been taken as evidence of complex cognition [2].
5The account of behavioural flexibility in this paper differs from com-
monly used species-level proxies of flexibility, such as innovations
(the number of anecdotally novel foraging techniques used per
species; e.g. [23]) and generalist versus specialist foraging strategies.
These proxies are measured at the species level, whereas behavioural
flexibility as understood here is measured at the individual level.
6For a review of the many of meanings of Morgan’s Canon, see
Thomas [35]; for analyses and critiques of specific interpretations,
see [36–39].
7We suspect that the unduly strong emphasis on simplicity in com-
parative cognition is a vestige of the initial psychological rather
than biological orientation of the field—for as Godfrey-Smith [51]
notes, the preference for the Occamist null hypothesis is endemic in
and largely peculiar to psychological science.
rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org
Interface
Focus
7:2016
14
 on April 21, 2017http://rsfs.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 8Note that when Godfrey-Smith refers to ‘cognition’, he may have in
mind a more restrictive account of information processing than the
big-tent account of cognition presupposes, as he uses the term
‘quasi-cognitive’ to describe non-mental information processing in
organisms [61].
9Although we expect neural structures to robustly correlate with
other traits in the cluster, many different types of neural architecture
may give rise to cognitive complexity [67], and thus the regularity
will break down if our descriptions of the neural correlates of cogni-
tive complexity are either too fine-grained or too broad. This explains
why increased absolute or relative brain size is not an adequate basis
by which to infer the existence of cognitive complexity in the context
of observations of behavioural flexibility. In particular, it explains
why an evolutionary increase in size or connectivity of any given
brain region is neither necessary nor sufficient for inferring the evol-
ution of cognitive complexity. It is not sufficient because although an
observation of neuroanatomical growth or complexification does
increase the subjective probability of cognitive complexity, there are
many possible selective functions reflected by such changes that
involve less complex forms of information processing, such as
enhanced perception capabilities. It is not necessary becausecognitive complexity could arise through the repurposing of existing
brain structures without any measurable increase in neural tissue
mass [68]. Without the additional observations of behavioural
flexibility, a heterogeneous selective environment, and more fine-
grained analyses of brain changes, the inference from neural
complexification to cognitive complexity will be weak.
10While current empirical support for the social brain hypothesis is
correlational rather than directly causal, the absence of causal data
does not necessarily mean that the hypothesis is under-evidenced.
Correlational data may be the best evidence we can expect to find
given the tandem coevolution of neurological and social complexity.
Just as increasingly complex motor capacities co-evolve with increas-
ingly complex perceptual capacities, complex social arrangements
may evolve in tandem with increasingly complex brains, and
the causal evolutionary interactions between them may be too
fine-grained to resolve.
11For instance, volumetric comparisons of the brain are difficult to
interpret as enlargement of a brain region does not necessarily corre-
late with an increase in the number of neurons, and neuronal density
may decrease as brains grow larger as has been found for some
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